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Municipal Law Regulation of Remote
Sensing in Outer Space
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The "'New Eye in Space"
Platforms in space provide a unique vantage point for studying
global problems such as pollution, drought and climatic changes, ' as
well as analyzing natural resources. One by-product of the 1960's
space race was a unique series of deep space photographs of the
earth.2 Using these photographs, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) recognized the potential of space-
based systems to acquire data for civilian purposes, and subse-
quently established the Earth Resources Survey Program in 1965. 3
The best known and most important component of that program is
Landsat.4 Landsats 1 and 2, launched in 1972 and 1975, respec-
tively, demonstrated that "the application of satellite-acquired data
on the Earth's surface is a practical reality."5 Landsat 1 was capable
of continually acquiring data at a fraction of the cost of traditional
methods.6 It located mineral deposits,7 surveyed crops,8 identified
polluted waters9 and mapped geographical formations. '0 One exam-
ple of Landsat's efficiency is its completion of an on-going mapping
project in just one day. Only one-quarter of the project had been
completed in five summers of work without the satellite. II
Landsat circles the earth in a near-polar orbit fourteen times
each day. 12 The same point on the earth comes under Landsat's sen-
1. N. SHORT, P. LOWMAN, JR., S. FREDEN & W. FINCH, JR., MISSION TO EARTH:
LANDSAT VIEWS THE WORLD 5 (1976) [hereinafter cited as MISSION TO EARTH].
2. The photographs were products of the Apollo program. Id
3. Id
4. ERTS was renamed Landsat in 1975 in order to make it more "recognizable" by
the public. Id
5. Id Landsat 3 was launched in 1978. Weir, Remote Sensing and the Law of Geophys-
ical Trespass, 1 NORTHRUP U.L.J. 83 (1980).
6. New Eye in Space, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 7, 1972, at 43.
7. DeSaussure, Remote Sensing by Satellite What Futurefor an International Regime,
71 AM. J. INT'L L. 707, 714 (1977).
8. MISSION TO EARTH, supra note I, at 5.
9. Id. at 25-26.
10. Id at 12.
I1. Id at 15.
12. Vlasic, Princiles Relating to Remote Sensing ofthe Earth from Space, in I MANUAL
94 Loy. LA. Int'l & Comp. L. J [Vol. 7:93
sors every eighteen days. 13 The onboard sensors include return
beam vidicon (RBV) television cameras using three special bands of
the light spectrum. 14 Landsat also carries a multi-spectral scanner
(MSS) which differentiates between the various types of light re-
ceived.' 5 Different materials on the earth's surface reflect different
wavelengths of light of varying intensity. 16 A given material regis-
ters on the four bands of the multi-spectral scanner with its own
"spectral signature."' 7 This spectral reading is then matched with a
previous reading confirmed at ground level in order to identify the
nature of the sensed material. 18
The MSS converts the intensity of the reflected earth light into
a digital code which corresponds to the wavelength and intensity of
the light reflected.19 The signal is then transmitted down to an earth
receiving station.20 Computers translate the digital codes into black
and white images, which are further transformed into color
images. 21 These images can be purchased for as little as a few dol-
lars from the Earth Resources Observation System Data Center.
22
The analyzed information represents a catalogue of a region's
natural resources and physical characteristics.23 For example, data
derived from Landsat images led to a discovery of copper ore in
Pakistan. 24 In 1981, Brazil reported thirty-nine projects using Land-
ON SPACE LAW 303, 309 (N. Jasentuliyana & R. Lee eds. 1979). A polar orbit is roughly
perpendicular to the Earth's equator. MISSION To EARTH, supra note 1, at 1.
13. Vlasic, supra note 12, at 305.
14. C. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 723-24 (1982);
MISSION TO EARTH, supra note I, at 2. The RBV consists of three television-type cameras,
each responding to a different part of the light spectrum. Id. at 438.
15. MISSION TO EARTH, supra note 1, at 2. The multi-spectral scanner produces a con-
tinuous image built up from successive scan lines which extend perpendicular to the satel-
lite's forward motion. The entering light strikes different sensors, each of which responds to
a different segment of the spectrum and an image is produced. ld
16. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 14, at 723.
17. MISSION TO EARTH, supra note 1, at 2.
18. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 14, at 723.
19. MISSION TO EARTH, supra note 1, at 2.
20. Id
21. Id The color image is known as a "false color image." The coloring of objects does
not necessarily match our normal visual images, i.e., water may be blue or black, while
vegetation tends to look red. ld
22. Weir, supra note 5, at 83.
23. See Morley, Remote Sensing Satellites - What Do They Actually Measure and How
Sensitive Is the Information, in THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF REMOTE SENSING FROM
OUTER SPACE 13 (Matte & DeSaussure eds. 1976).
24. DeSaussure, supra note 7, at 714.
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sat data in various natural resource areas.25 Urban planners in the
United States at both state and local levels are enthusiastic about
Landsat data and want the program expanded. 26 The present
breadth of fields serviced is notable: environment, agriculture and
forestry, geography, geology, hydrology, oceanography, and marine
resources. 27
Although Landsat is a major component of the United States
remote sensing program, there are other American systems and for-
eign competitors. Space Shuttle crews have engaged in high resolu-
tion photography which has resulted in several remarkable
images. 28
This brief introduction suggests the breadth of information
available and the scope of remote sensing. Because remote sensing
from space is still in its adolescence and likely to mature in the next
few decades, 29 the legal questions surrounding the use of remote
sensing should be addressed as soon as possible. On July 23, 1972,
the United States launched Landsat 1.30 Landsat D-Prime, the fifth
satellite in the Landsat series, was launched on March 1, 1984.31
Since its inception, the remarkable nature of the Landsat system has
been both recognized 32 and feared 33 as a threat to state sovereignty
25. U.N. Doc. A/A.C.105/297/Add.2 at 2-40.
26. DeSaussure, supra note 7, at 708.
27. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 14, at 722.
28. L.A. Times, Jan. 17, 1984, part 1, at 2, col. 1; Shuttle Crew Photographs Soviet Sites,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan. 9, 1984, at 19. The Space Shuttle Mission 9/Space Lab
1 astronauts took photographs of secret Soviet space launch sites at Tyuratam. The details
of these photographs were previously only available from military reconnaissance sources.
Id. A second image showed a new Soviet rocket. L.A. Times, Jan. 17, 1984, part 1, at 2, col.
1. The picture was sufficiently clear to calculate the rocket's anticipated thrust and indicate
that it was launch-ready. Id
29. See Two-step Operational Landrat Plan Set, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., July
14, 1980, at 108.
30. New Eye in Space, supra note 6, at 43.
31. Lowndes, NASA Will Stress Environmental Studies, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., Mar. 12, 1984, at 107.
32. Arch B. Parks, Director of the Earth Resources Survey Program, stated:
[t]he thing that ERTS [Landsat] will do that is almost impossible to do any other
way. . . is to provide both a timely and accurate inventory of resources, not just
of our country, but of a great huge part of the world.
New Eye in Space, supra note 6, at 43.
33. The capability to acquire detailed information about states without their permis-
sion "alarm[ed] those who fear that the information gathered by the satellite might well be
used by some nations or even individuals for political advantage or economic gain." Id
This concern has continued to be echoed as a major justification for regulating remote sens-
ing. See DeSaussure, supra note 7, at 714.
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and privacy. However, in the twelve years since Landsat first made
commercial remote sensing a reality,34 no definitive accord prevent-
ing its abuse has been reached. 35
B. Existing Legal Viewpoints and Municipal Law
The advent of Landsat I and other remote sensing systems 36
present new and pressing questions to the international legal com-
munity. The central question to be addressed is whether interna-
tional law is violated when information is collected about a state
from outer space without the sensed 37 state's permission. 38
One view, expressed mostly by commentators in the United
States, is that remote sensing does not violate international law.39
Remote sensing is considered analogous to such internationally ac-
cepted activities as using the airspace over international waters as a
vantage point from which to observe other states.4° The opposing
view disputes this pro-legality argument by stressing that remote
sensing impacts the earth regardless of where the activity takes
place, and that a state has the right to exercise its sovereignty to
protect its resources and activities.4 1
This Comment will evaluate how the two legal viewpoints
noted above have withstood a decade of debate and consideration.
Additionally, this Comment will discuss the ultimate issue underly-
34. Remote sensing became part of the agenda of the Legal Sub-Committee of the
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in 1972.
Stowe, The Development of International Law Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from
Outer Space, 5 J. SPACE L. 101, 101 n.l (1977).
35. See Report of the Chairman of the Working Group on Remote Sensing, U.N. Doc.
A/AC. 105/305/Annex I at 1 (1982). For example, items 10 through 17 discuss the differing
views expressed by delegations concerning remote sensing regulation. Id at 2-5.
36. A good example of foreign competition is the French SPOT Program. SPOT,
scheduled to become operational in 1984, carries a high resolution package superior to
Landsat. France Studies Reconnaissance Version of SPOT Spacecraft, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., Aug. 10, 1981, at 58. The television camera mode has a resolution of 10
meters, while the multiband mode is 20 meters. Id By contrast, Landsat D's multi-spectral
scanner's resolution is only 80 meters. Covault, Landsat D to Yield More Precise Data,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., July 5, 1982, at 40, 46.
37. "Sensed" will be used to denote the state whose territory is being observed. "Sens-
ing" will denote the state which is acquiring the data.
38. See G. REIJNEN, UTILIZATION OF OUTER SPACE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 67
(1981); see also Stowe, supra note 34, at 101.
39. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 14, at 733-34; Vlasic, supra note 12, at 309.
40. See DeSaussure, supra note 7, at 710 (suggesting it would be "unrealistic and artifi-
cial" to distinguish between earth-oriented and other space activities); C. CHRISTOL, supra
note 14, at 731-32.
41. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 14, at 732.
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ing this debate, namely the remedial measures a state might take to
protect itself from the negative effects of remote sensing.
II. STATE SOVEREIGNTY VS. FREE ACCESS
A. Does Remote Sensing Violate International Law?
Unfortunately, Landsat does not possess the ability to discern
political borders. "The natural swath of the satellite sensors com-
monly cuts across many national boundaries. The exercise of sepa-
rating the billions of data bits along the lines of political boundaries
is both financially prohibitive and scientifically disadvantageous." 42
As a consequence, the United States program produces information
about the entire world, all of it available at reasonable prices.43
Images of both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of
China are readily available from the United States government,
even though neither the Soviet Union nor China has agreed to such
a program.44 The unrestricted availability of information without
the consent of the sensed state is the focus of the debate concerning
remote sensing.
Article I of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 declares that all
outer space activities must be carried out "in accordance with inter-
national law." 45 This phrase is repeated in Article 111.46 Therefore,
outer space activities are governed by customary international law,
47
as modified by the treaty. Nevertheless, two distinct viewpoints
have developed concerning remote sensing. 48 The first argues that a
state's sovereignty includes the power to control information about
itself and, consequently, that unconsented acquisition and distribu-
tion of this information violates a state's sovereign rights. 49 The op-
posing view, which has been most closely associated with the views
of the United States, claims that remote sensing is legal and that the
free collection and dissemination of remotely sensed data is in ac-
42. Address by Ambassador W.T. Bennet, Jr., before First Committee of the U.N.
General Assembly, Oct. 13, 1975, quoted in Vlasic, supra note 12, at 322.
43. Quinn, Photogrammetry Updatedfor the Legal Profession, 4 NORTHRUP U.L.J. 183
(1983); DeSaussure, supra note 7, at 709.
44. DeSaussure, supra note 7, at 709.
45. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, art. I, 18
U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited as Outer Space Treaty].
46. Id art. III.
47. G. REIJNEN, supra note 38, at 7 1.
48. See C. CHRISTOL, supra note 14, at 732.
49. Id at 732-33.
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cord with international law.50 The former view is commonly re-
ferred to as the restrictive view and the latter as the free access view.
The particular characterization of "territory" is the foundation
for each of the differing viewpoints on whether remote sensing vio-
lates international law. Under international law, "territory" is char-
acterized as:
a. a State's own territory;
b. the territory of another State within which a given State may
not exercise its power in any form; and
c. territory not belonging to any State, which is, in its turn, di-
vided into two categories: territorium nuiius (= territory of
nobody) and territorium extra commercium (= territory
outside commerce) (the high seas and outer space). 51
The two viewpoints vary in their outcome depending upon the de-
termination of where the remote sensing "occurs" with respect to
these territorial definitions.
B. The Free Access View
The free access argument is based upon an analogy to the pe-
ripheral photographic and electronic reconnaissance which occurred
during the nineteen fifties and sixties. 52 In those instances, recon-
naissance aircraft flew the contours of different states' borders, me-
ticulously avoiding crossing over any political boundaries. Many
states, including the United States, believe such surveillance con-
ducted from either the high seas or international airspace is legal.53
These states acknowledge that a state has complete and exclusive
sovereignty over the airspace directly above its territory. 54 They
point out, however, that as long as there is no physical violation of
another state's airspace, the other state's sovereignty is not violated
and the activity is lawful.
55
50. Id.
51. G. REIJNEN, supra note 38, 709.
52. C. CHISTOL, supra note 14, at 732.
53. Orlando, Collection and Dissemination of Data Through Remote Sensing, 1 NoR-
THRUP U.L.J. 121, 131 (1980).
54. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, art. I, 61 Stat. 1180,
T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
55. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 14, at 732. The U-2 incident of May 1, 1960, provides a
striking example. There, an American airplane actually penetrated Soviet airspace and was
legally shot down. A contemporaneous program of U.S. RB-47 aircraft doing functionally
the same mission from international airspace was considered legal and not interfered with.
Id at 731-32.
[Vol. 7:93
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Support for this theory is also found in Article II of the Outer
Space Treaty. Outer space is considered territorium extra com-
mercium under Article II, which states that "[o]uter space. . . is not
subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means
of the use or occupation or by any other means."5 6 If this territory,
like the high seas or international airspace, is not within another
state's sovereign territory, then remote sensing from outer space
must be legal. 5
7
There are two problems with this territorial analogy. First,
although military reconnaissance from international airspace is con-
sidered legal, it is also consensual. 58 For example, recognizing the
need to allow both sides to verify compliance with the SALT II
Treaty, the treaty impliedly permitted use of "national technical
means of verification." 59 There appears to be no similar national
security incentive to allow such surveillance for a civilian-oriented
system.60 Second, the type of data acquired tends to be different be-
cause of its economic potential and intended use.
61
C. State Sovereignty. The Restrictive View
From its inception, the potential for abuse of remote sensing
data was recognized and formed part of the foundation of the re-
strictive viewpoint. 62 In 1972, the anticipated capabililty of Landsat
"alarmed those who [thought that] the information gathered by the
satellite might well be used by some nations or even individuals for
political advantage or economic gain." 63 As previously stated, the
restrictive view is based upon a state's sovereignty and its right to
protect against the intrusive effects of another sensing its territory.
64
A fundamental aspect of state sovereignty65 is control over national
56. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 45, art. II.
57. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 14, at 732.
58. See M. FORKOSCH, OUTER SPACE AND LEGAL LIABILITY 132, 163 n.31 (1982).
59. Id at 164 n.32 (citing BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T ST. BULL., Pub. No.
8979, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Apr. 4, 1979, at 3, col. 3).
60. See DeSaussure, supra note 7, at 713 (noting that earth resource satellites pose no
immediate threat to a state's national security or political security).
61. See supra text accompanying notes 23-27.
62. New Eye Ah Space, supra note 6, at 43; DeSaussure, supra note 7, at 714.
63. New Eye in Space, supra note 6, at 43.
64. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 14, at 732; Polter, Remote Sensing and State Sovereignty, 4
J. SPACE L. 99, 105-06 (1976).
65. For a discussion of sovereignty and its relation to space law, see G. REUNEN, supra
note 38, at 5-12.
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resources and wealth.66 The restrictive viewpoint, largely supported
by Third World nations, asserts that information about resources is
tantamount to the resource itself and, therefore, is subject to exclu-
sive sovereign control.
67
The restrictive viewpoint received support in the Bogota Decla-
ration of 1976.68 This Declaration claimed that segments of the geo-
stationary orbit69 are part of the sovereign territory of the equatorial
states below.7 0 The signatory states7' argued four basic points:
a) The geostationary orbit is a physical fact rising from the na-
ture of our planet because its existence depends exclusively on its
relation to gravitational phenomena caused by the Earth and for
that reason should not be considered as part of outer space.
b) The geostationary orbit is a scarce national resource.
c) The international community is now calling into question all
the terms of international law laid down in the Outer Space
Treaty of 1967, which were drawn up at a time when the develop-
ing countries could not count on adequate scientific advice. The
terms, according to the Declaration, were prepared by the indus-
trialized states for their own benefit.
d) As there is no definition of outer space, the provision in the
Space Treaty regarding nonappropriation of this space is inappli-
cable .... 72
The third and fourth points are significant because they question the
fundamental principles of freedom of use and non-appropriation of
outer space73 as stated in the Outer Space Treaty.74 If all of the pro-
visions of the Outer Space Treaty are being questioned on the
ground that the treaty was aimed at economic oppression by the
industrialized states, 75 its applicability to all space issues becomes
66. DeSaussure, supra note 7, at 711.
67. Polter, supra note 64, at 108.
68. Bogota Declaration of 1976, reprinted in C. CHRISTOL, supra note 14, at 891.
69. The geostationary synchronous orbit is a near circular orbit on the equatorial plane
which completes one orbit in the same time the earth makes one rotation. As a result, the
satellite appears to stay in one place over the surface of the earth. Id.
70. Id.
71. The signatories are Brazil, Colombia, Congo, Ecuador, Kenya, Indonesia, Uganda
and Zaire. Id at 895.
72. Goedhuis, Influence on the Conquest of Outer Space on National Sovereignty, 6 J.
SPACE L. 37, 38-39 (1978) (emphasis added). The nonappropriation provision of the Outer
Space Treaty is Article II. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 45, art. II.
73. Goedhuis, supra note 72, at 39. See generally C. CHRISTOL, supra note 14, at 520.
74. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 45, arts. I & II.
75. Bogota Declaration, pt. 4, reprinted in C. CHRISTOL, supra note 14, at 894.
[Vol. 7:93
Regulation of Remote Sensing
suspect. 76
The view expressed in the Declaration, however, has been se-
verely criticized 77 on both scientific and legal grounds.78 First, the
claim that the geostationary orbit is based on gravity-a function of
the earth and not of space-belies other forces at work. 79 A geosta-
tionary satellite must be maintained in its correct orbit through peri-
odic adjustments in positioning, speed and altitude, just as any other
orbital object.8 0 Moreover, the gravity holding the object "in place"
is not just a product of the state below, but of the whole earth.8'
Second, the legal claim that the geostationary orbit is not in
outer space is unfounded.8 2 The signatory states argue that freedom
of use and exploitation, the same issues which arise in remote sens-
ing, were not an integral part of international legal norms at the
time the Outer Space Treaty was adopted in 1967.83 Professor
Goedhuis suggests the 1967 treaty did not create international space
law but merely codified existing law.84 Therefore, the complaint of
the Bogota Declaration signatories is specious because the states
were already bound to follow the two basic principles of freedom of
use and non-appropriation. 85
Because the claims of the Bogota Declaration are unpersuasive,
it is unlikely that they will have any impact on remote sensing.86
Nevertheless, the Bogota Declaration has garnered some support.87
Two points deserve notice, even if the underlying argument is
faulty: (1) the claims are based upon state sovereignty and, since the
76. The underlying claim of the signatory states is that at the time of the execution of
the treaty they were at a technical and economic disadvantage and that as a result the treaty
gave an unfair advantage to the space powers. Therefore, they argue, they should not be
held to the treaty's terms because all of its provisions are suspect. Id
77. For an excellent summary of various scholars' rejection of the Bogota Declaration,
see C. CHRISTOL, supra note 14, at 513-21.
78. Id, Goedhuis, supra note 72, at 39-40.
79. Rosenfield, Where Airspace Ends and Outer Space Begins, 7 J. SPACE L. 137, 142
(1977); Goedhuis, supra note 72, at 39.
80. Rosenfield, supra note 79, at 142.
81. Goedhuis, supra note 72, at 39.
82. Rosenfield, supra note 79, at 142.
83. See, e.g., C. CHRISTOL, supra note 14, at 464 (Colombia expressed this opinion in
1975).
84. Goedhuis, supra note 72, at 40; see also C. CHRISTOL, supra note 14, at 518.
85. Goedhuis, supra note 72, at 40.
86. Rosenfield, supra note 79, at 142. Even Brazil, a sister equatorial state, has refused
to join in the declaration. Id
87. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 14, at 520, 546 n.401 (discussing views expressed by G.
MARCOFF, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE L'ESCAPE 618-20 (1973)).
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treaty did not by its terms divide sovereign airspace and sover-
eignty-free outer space, there is some room for legitimate disagree-
ment; and (2) the Declaration is retaliatory in nature, i.e., it is an
attempt to gain control in this area in order to overcome feelings of
helplessness and insecurity.88 Both of these reasons could also be
applied to the remote sensing debate. However, the Declaration's
effect on the remote sensing debate should be negligible, since its
overall impetus is weak on the geostationary orbit issue-an issue
that has been overwhelmingly rejected by the international legal
community.89
Moreover, it is unnecessary to discard the Outer Space Treaty's
precepts of freedom of use and exploitation via the Bogota Declara-
tion in order to conclude that remote sensing is illegal. Utilizing ter-
ritorial definitions of international law,90 Professor Reijnen asserts,
as do United States commentators, that the place where the infor-
mation gathering occurs, and not the nature of the information
gathered, determines the legality of the gathering activity.9' How-
ever, Professor Reijnen reached a conclusion contrary to United
States commentators: "Territorial sovereignty implies . . . that re-
mote sensing by one State's satellite cannot be carried out in the
territory of another State, unless it is with that State's consent."92
This conclusion necessarily implies that Professor Reijnen considers
the activity to occur within the sensed state's sovereign territory. In
addition, Professor Reijnen believes that any state which uses re-
mote sensing without the permission of the sensed state is violating
an existing rule of international law.
93
IV. MUNICIPAL RESTRICTIONS ON REMOTE SENSING FROM
OUTER SPACE
A. The Impetus for Municpa/ Restrictions
As the foregoing discussion points out, present international
law apparently does not restrict remote sensing. Nevertheless, states
which are the object of remote sensing have legitimate concerns re-
garding the unrestricted acquisition and dissemination of the data.94
88. Id at 520.
89. See supra text accompanying note 86.
90. See supra text accompanying note 51.
91. G. REJNEN, supra note 38, at 71.
92. Id
93. Id.
94. DeSaussure, supra note 7, at 714.
Regulation of Remote Sensing
These concerns are twofold because remote sensing involves both a
state's economic and military security.95 The economic threat is il-
lustrated in the following scenario: State A learns of either a
bumper crop or crop devastation in state B. This information may
put state B at state A's mercy, economically. 96 Use of remote sensing
data could thus remove state Bs control over its own economy.
A second problem involves data which has military implica-
tions.97 Although images from civilian remote sensing satellites do
not equal those from military reconnaissance satellites,98 this does
not mean the civilian information has no military importance. Rela-
tively mundane information, such as topographical maps, may be
considered sensitive by a sensed state. 99 Even more sensitive mili-
tary data could also be acquired. For example, violations of the
United States-USSR interim SALT I Agreement and the Anti-Bal-
listic Missile Treaty were discovered in Landsat images. I°°
Thus, both a state's sovereign interests in national security and
economic independence may be infringed through unrestricted re-
mote sensing. What can a state do in response to such a potential
threat? The answer may lie in the state's own municipal law.' 0'
B. Nationality Jurisdiction and the Outer Space Treaty
The preliminary issue is whether, absent any express prohibi-
tion in the Outer Space Treaty, a state has jurisdiction 10 2 over an
activity in the sovereignty-free zone of space by basing its jurisdic-
tional power upon customary international law.
The Outer Space Treaty includes what has been termed the
"nationality" basis for jurisdiction, 103 although "such a confirmation
of jurisdiction need not be exclusive"' 10 4 and "another basis ofjuris-
95. Id; Morley, supra note 23, at 15.
96. DeSaussure, supra note 7, at 714.
97. Morley, supra note 23, at 15.
98. Id
99. Id
100. B. JASANI, OUTER SPACE: BATTLEFIELD OF THE FUTURE? 26 (1978).
101. "Municipal law" is the law or rule of an individual state or nation. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 918 (5th ed. 1979).
102. Jurisdiction has two meanings. First, it may be "prescriptive," i.e., authority to
make a rule of law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 7, 8 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS]. Jurisdic-
tion is also the authority to enforce the rule promulgated pursuant to a state's prescriptive
jurisdiction. A state may have one but not necessarily the other in a given situation. Id
103. DeSaussure, supra note 7, at 718-19; Outer Space Treaty, supra note 45, art. VIII.
104. DeSaussure, supra note 7, at 719.
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diction, territoriality, may apply concurrently." 105 Article VIII of the
treaty, although recognizing nationality jurisdiction, does not ex-
clude any other basis.10 6
1. The Lotus
One jurisdictional theory which has been advanced is based
upon a Permanent Court of International Justice decision10 7 involv-
ing two vessels which collided while on the high seas. The Lotus, a
French mail steamer, collided with a Turkish vessel, the Boz-Kourt,
in international waters off the coast of Turkey. 10 8 The Boz-Kourt
sank, claiming the lives of eight Turkish citizens. 09 The Lotus at-
tempted a rescue before proceeding on to Constantinople, which is
Turkish territory. After an investigation, both the captain of the
Boz-Kourt and the watch officer of the Lotus were arrested." 0
The watch officer, a Frenchman, was prosecuted under a sec-
tion of the Turkish Penal Code"'I which authorized Turkey to pros-
ecute any person who injures the state of Turkey or a Turkish
citizen while outside Turkish territory." 2 The watch officer was con-
victed, fined and sentenced to prison.' '3 The prosection of the Lo-
tus' watch officer resulted in the case being brought before the
International Court. 114 The question framed for the court was sim-
ply "whether criminal jurisdiction does or does not exist in this
case."' 5 France protested jurisdiction from the outset, 1 6 claiming
that, as the flag nation of the Lotus, it had exclusive jurisdiction over
everything that occurred aboard the ship. 1 7 Turkey answered by
arguing that jurisdiction is proper "whenever such jurisdiction does
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 102, § 18.
106. DeSaussure, supra note 7, at 719.
107. Id at 718. The Lotus, (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9.
108. 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9, at 10.
109. Id
110. Id at 11.
1i1. "Any foreigner who.., commits an offense abroad to the prejudice of Turkey or
of a Turkish subject. . . shall be punished with the Turkish penal code provided that he is
arrested in Turkey." Turkish Penal Code, art. VI, Law No. 765, of Mar. 1, 1927, reprinted in
27 P.C.I.J., ser. A., No. 9, at 14-15.
112. 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A., No. 9, at 14-15.
113. Id at 11.
114. Id at 13.
115. Id.
116. Id
117. Id at 22.
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not come into conffict with a principle of international law."" I The
fundamental difference between these two positions is that the
French view presumes a restriction" 19 upon Turkey's prescriptive ju-
risdiction in that there is no express rule which gives it the right to
have legislated over acts in international territory. Turkey's view is
based upon the inherent power and independence of states. 20
The court adopted the Turkish theory,' 2' holding that, while
there is a general prohibition against a state exercising jurisdiction
outside of its territory, 122 the prohibition does not preclude the as-
sertion of jurisdiction over acts occurring outside of the state's
territory: 1
23
Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that
states may not extend the application of their laws and jurisdic-
tion of their courts to persons, property and acts outside their ter-
ritory ... [states have jurisdiction] which is only limited in
certain cases by prohibitive rules: as regards other cases, every
state remains free to adopt the principles it regards as best and
most suitable.' 24
The court then proceeded to analyze whether, under the facts of
the case, Turkey had violated any express restrictions of interna-
tional law. 2 5 France contended it was a violation of international
law to exercise jurisdiction over the watch officer merely because of
the nationality of the victim. 26 The court rejected this contention,
because it ignores the fact that the effect of the watch officer's negli-
gence was felt aboard a Turkish vessel. 27 The test the court applied
is based in territoriality. 128 The court observed that states may claim
jurisdiction even though the actor is not within the country during
the commission of the crime "if one of the constituent elements to




122. Id at 18-19.
123. Id at 19. Here, although the acts occurred outside of Turkish territory, the defend-
ant was within Turkish territory at the time of prosecution. The exercise of jurisdiction was
only for acts outside of its territory, not for persons.
124. Id at 22.
125. Id at 22-23.
126. Id The French contended that this was legally insufficient to assert criminal juris-
diction. The court reserved its opinion on the correctness of that conclusion. Id
127. Id A ship is "assimilated" into the territory of the nation whose flag it flies. Id
128. Id
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the offense, and more especially its effects, have taken place."'' 29
The court's holding, therefore, will allow a state to claim juris-
diction over acts which occur outside its own territory if any constit-
uent part of the illegal activity or its effects invade the state's
territory.
2. Extraterritorial application of United States antitrust laws
The theory applied in The Lotus was subsequently restated by a
federal court in United States Y. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica (Alcoa).130
In Alcoa, the government challenged various agreements Alcoa had
with European aluminum manufacturers and European corpora-
tions which allegedly violated United States antitrust laws. One of
the questions presented to the court was whether United States anti-
trust laws apply to a foreign corporation which did no business in
the United States.' 31 The court accepted the United States' view,
which it thought consonant with international law, that a state may
attach liability for actions occurring wholly outside its boundaries
when the effects of those actions occur within. 32 This theory is
more widely known as the "objective theory" of territorial
jurisdiction.133
The objective theory of territorial jurisdiction allows a state to
hold parties liable for their violations which are commenced abroad
but consummated within its territory. 34 The application of munici-
pal antitrust law to foreign persons and activities was necessitated
by the increase in the number of multinational corporations. 135 Ac-
cording to the United States Justice Department, antitrust laws are
designed to include foreign activity "to prevent national boundaries
from providing a haven from which Americans may flout laws
designed to protect our domestic competition." 136 If a strictly territo-
129. Id
130. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
131. Id at 443.
132. Id at 444.
133. Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws, 33 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 146, 156 (1957). See generally Comment, The Expanding Extraterritorial Juris-
diction ofthe Sherman Antitrust Act: Intent and Effects in the Balance, 6 Loy. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 463 (1983).
134. Shenefield, The Perspective of the U.S. Department of Justice, in PERSPECTIVES ON
THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE U.S. ANTITRUST AND OTHER LAWS 16 (J.
Griffin ed. 1979).
135. Jennings, supra note 133, at 146-47.
136. Shenefield, supra note 134, at 13.
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rial view were followed, the antitrust laws would probably fail to
protect a vital American interest, i.e., free competition. 137 The tre-
mendous impact multinational organizations have on a single na-
tion's economy underscores the need for an enforcement tool which
can be used wherever the violation occurs.
138
Another justification for extraterritorial application of antitrust
laws is the lack of international regulation. 39 As stated by one Jus-
tice Department official:
[s]ignificant differences in local political and economic philoso-
phies, and the lack of an effective international administrative
mechanism, preclude, for the foreseeable future, the development
of supranational regulation. . . . But for the present, individual
countries have no choice but to utilize their municipal law to attempt
to control those external arrangments directly threatening to their
domestic economies. 40
The justification for using municipal antitrust laws directly par-
allels remote sensing concerns. States could use municipal legisla-
tion aimed at protecting themselves and their citizens as much as
possible from the negative effects of remote sensing. Many states
have laws that, for example, protect the right of a landowner from
having his property surveyed or. his unique objects photographed
without his permission, or his privacy invaded.' 4' A state could ex-
ercise its police power and attach liability, civil or criminal, to be-
havior which violates such rights.
3. Analogous United States cases
The American theory of jurisdiction to control behavior abroad
which is not controlled by international convention is not restricted
to antitrust law. In other areas which are considered vital, statutes
are often given extraterritorial application.142 For example, in Ford
v. United States, 4 3 rum smugglers were charged with conspiring to
illegally import liquor into the United States. Two of the accused
smugglers objected, arguing that they could not be convicted be-
137. Id, Jennings, supra note 133, at 146.
138. Shenefield, supra note 134, at 13.
139. Id. at 14.
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 103-06.
142. For a discussion of this topic, see generally Weir, supra note 5, at 88-98.
143. 273 U.S. 593 (1926). The basis for this type of assertion of jurisdiction is actually
quite old in United States law. See, e.g., Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 284-85 (1910).
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cause neither was present in the United States during the term of the
conspiracy.' 44 The Court rejected this argument on the ground that
additional co-conspirators were present within United States terri-
tory.' 45 This fact put the conspiracy within the United States' juris-
diction, notwithstanding the fact that neither of these two
defendants had set foot on American soil.146
The district court in United States v. Rodriguez147 found a juris-
dictional basis for the prosecution of foreign nationals who had con-
spired to violate United States immigration laws. 148 All of the
alleged acts took place in foreign territory; nonetheless, the court
concluded that Congress intended to reach this type of conspir-
acy. 49 Furthermore, the court concluded that the United States had
the "power to try an alien for a crime committed abroad."'' 50
In Rivard v. United States,'5' the appellant was charged with
conspiracy to smuggle heroin into the United States. 52 The Fifth
Circuit stated the issue before it as follows:
[t]he first question we are called upon to decide is whether the
District Court had jurisdiction to try an alien for a conspiracy
...formed without the United States, several of the overt acts
having been committed within the United States by a co-
conspirator. 53
Applying the objective territorial principle, 154 the Fifth Circuit held
that the district court had jurisdiction over an alien not present in
the United States at the time of the offense. 155 The court stressed
that Rivard, the absent co-conspirator, had intentionally sent others
into the United States while he remained in another country, and
that the conspiracy was directed toward violating United States
law. 156
These cases aside, there are limits to extraterritorial application
144. 273 U.S. at 619-20.
145. Id. at 624.
146. Id.
147. 182 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
148. Id at 493-94.
149. Id at 491.
150. Id. at 493.
151. 375 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1967).
152. Id. at 884.
153. Id. at 886.
154. Id at 886-87.
155. Id.
156. Id at 886.
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of United States law. 157 In the Timberlane case, the Ninth Circuit
held that at some point the interest of the United States became too
weak to justify jurisdiction when balanced against the discord cre-
ated overseas. 158 At that point, the domestic court should dismiss the
action. 5 9
C. A Modelfor the Control of Remote Sensing
How do the foregoing examples provide a model for states who
wish to control remote sensing from outer space? Put simply, states
could make the unauthorized acquisition, transfer or use of remote
sensing data a violation of their municipal law. This remedy might
seem useless in that a smaller Third World state does not have the
enforcement capabilities of a superpower such as the United States.
Nevertheless, several factors may make this approach feasible. First,
the nature of the parties which are actively remote sensing will
change in the near future from governmental to private entities such
as corporations. 60 Second, private industry is the single largest user
of remote sensing data; the most frequent private user is the petro-
leum industry. ' 6'
Two municipal law formulae could use this trend toward pri-
vate use and ownership to the state's advantage. A state could attach
liability, civil or criminal, to unauthorized remote sensing activity.
Of course, making the acquisition of data illegal may have little ef-
fect on those companies which never physically enter the sensed
state and therefore never become subject to the state's enforcement
jurisdiction. In all of the previously discussed cases, the United
States had physical custody of the defendants. 62 The question that
arises is whether the purchasers of remote sensing data would be
willing to use it if to do so they must (1) violate the law of the state
157. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 1002-03 (5th Cir. 1977) (where
activity was legal in foreign state, no application of United States law was intended by Con-
gress); El Cid, Ltd. v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 551 F. Supp. 626, 629-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (where
effect on United States of alleged violation of Sherman Antitrust Act would be de minimis,
there is no jurisdiction); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n,
549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
158. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 609.
159. Id at 615.
160. Marsh, Landsat Extension to Rest on Private Sector Support, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., July 27, 1981, at 26. The prime contenders to purchase the U.S. Landsat sys-
tem were Comsat General Corp., Itek Corp., Terra-Mar and Hughes Aircraft. Id
161. Weir, supra note 5, at 84.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 143, 147 & 151.
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whose territory is being sensed; and (2) submit themselves to the
enforcement jurisdiction of the state to utilize the information
purchased? If a petroleum corporation (Petro Corp.), for example,
were to discover signs of oil in a given state, the criminal or civil
liability it would incur in either actually remote sensing or buying
the data from a remote sensing company may effectively preclude
any further development. 63 Merely purchasing the data would be a
crime if it was considered a conspiracy to violate the remote sensing
restrictions, because, under Ford v. United States, Petro Corp. would
be criminally liable for the acts of the actual data acquisition done
by the absent defendant. 64
Another control structure may be more beneficial to the sensed
state. Because a state may be disadvantaged if large multinational
corporations know more about the state's natural resources than the
state itself does, the state could require disclosure of all material
data which the corporation relied upon in deciding whether to com-
plete a transaction within the state. In the petroleum example above,
assume Petro Corp. used remote sensing data to identify potential
oil deposits within state A. Petro Corp. is obligated to purchase
some kind of mineral extraction right in order to use this informa-
tion. State A could require Petro Corp. to turn over to it, or require
the party with whom Petro Corp. is contracting to disclose, all of the
remote sensing data Petro Corp. possesses concerning the purchase
of mineral rights. Both parties to the contract would then be in
equal bargaining positions and neither could complain later about
unfair access to information.
As possible sanctions, there are the ordinary criminal statutes,
although civil remedies may actually work better. If a corporation
is found to have used undisclosed remote sensing data, this could
work a forfeiture of any and all contract or property rights acquired
and any improvements made in reliance upon them. If two years
later Petro Corp. is found to have not disclosed remote sensing data
to its grantor or optioner, it would lose both the grant or option it
purchased as well as any oil wells, structures or other improvements
it had made. This sanction, of course, could be applied, based upon
the discussion above, even if the data is only used in a foreign
163. The United States Government has adopted this view as part of its justification for
unfettered dissemination of geological information. It reasons that geological data, no mat-
ter how detailed, is useless without the right to develop the surveyed land. Wier, supra note
5, at 99-100.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 143-46.
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country. 65
Neither concept, required disclosure or forfeiture for failure to
comply with statutes, is alien to United States law. For example, in
securities transactions, disclosure of all material facts is mandated
by the Securities and Exchange Commission's Rule lOb-5.1 66 Under
Rule lOb-5, all untrue statements as well as any material omissions
made in connection with a securities transaction are illegal. 67 A ma-
terial fact is one which, under the circumstances, is necessary to
make any statement made not misleading.16 8 This rule furthers Con-
gress' intent to put all investors on an equal footing with respect to
investment information. 69 A sensed state that fears an imbalance of
knowledge concerning natural resources could use a similarly con-
structed statute to compel disclosure of any remotely sensed data
before it can be used.
The use of forfeiture as a deterrent to misconduct has also been
used in the United States. California has a statute which bars a
building contractor from maintaining an action for services per-
formed while unlicensed. 70 The practical effect of the statute is to
work a forfeiture of the builder's services and material.' 7' The un-
derlying rationale is one of deterrence, stressing protection of the
buying public even at the cost of great inequity in some
circumstances. 72
A sensed state could similarly require compliance with its dis-
closure requirements or even non-use of remote sensing data with a
threat of forfeiture. The risk that all capital improvements and
purchase payments might be forfeited for non-compliance would be
a substantial deterrent to corporations which must develop re-
sources before profiting from them.
165. See supra text accompanying note 129.
166. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983).
167. Id § 240.10b-5(b).
168. Id
169. S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851-52 (2d Cir. 1968).
170. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7031 (West 1975).
171. Lewis & Queen v. N.M. Ball & Sons, 48 Cal. 2d 141, 150, 308 P.2d 713, 719 (1957).
172. Id at 150-51, 308 P.2d at 719.
As an alternative to this proposed model for the control of remote sensing, see generally
Comment, Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space.: Considerations Toward Develop-
ment of a Functional International Regime, 2 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 157 (1979) (ar-
gues for control of remote sensing by the United Nations).
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V. CONCLUSION
The ongoing legal debate surrounding remote sensing reflects
the rapid growth of technology in this century. Remote sensing is-
sues are but a small sample of issues which will arise more and more
frequently as the process of shrinking the world by technological
advancement continues. The remedy offered above may not be best
suited to a world in need of ready access to natural resources, but it
is based upon a concept, sovereignty, which is today still at the heart
of international law. Any system for controlling remote sensing,
whether achieved through United Nations deliberations or bilater-
ally, will have to take this factor into account. A state's claim to
sovereignty must shrink as the world does in order to accommodate
the needs of mankind as a whole, especially in combatting world-
wide problems such as hunger, drought and pollution, the types of
problems with which remote sensing is best able to deal. Therefore,
any eventual international regime should attempt to maximize the
use of remote sensing for the benefit of all mankind, taking away the
need for the remedial domestic legislation proposed above.
Hans Van Ligten
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